Afghanistan: how did it get to this point?

The short message: After nearly twenty years of the latest round of international assistance to Afghanistan, the country has advanced in some aspects, but not so far on the central issue of national cohesion and peace. This is because the efforts have over-emphasised foreign interests and training and given less attention to local interests, incentives and motivations. As a result, the impact of the assistance is limited and not sustained while local solutions have been stymied. The recent report from the Afghanistan Study Group epitomises this mistake.

The longer message: How did Afghanistan get to this point after so much assistance? The Afghanistan Study Group’s final report (Feb 2021) is not easy reading because it sounds an alarm that the developmental gains achieved at great cost over the last twenty years are at great risk of being lost. How can this be? Because these gains are not owned by Afghans, because national institutions have not matured to support the development process (this includes institutions that govern law and rights), because the social power of the Taliban, which derives from their spiritual leadership, has not been recognised, because the pace of change has been too slow and because the money associated with the international assistance has been a corrrupting influence. Overall, the assistance process has been foreign, not Afghan.

The report is also uncomfortable reading because it embodies the fallacy that foreign expertise can fix things. The work of the United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan Study Group epitomizes the style of the last two decades: too foreign and too slow. The study group of twelve people does not include an Afghan; of the 26 people that advised the group, there was only one Afghan; and they all took fourteen months from enabling legislation to final report. The group even aimed at the wrong objective: it set out to find the solution that best suits USA’s interests, rather than finding a solution that would most likely bring peace to Afghanistan. The report contains partisan and inadequate analysis, it glosses over some facts and has the usual foreigner problem of urban and elite bias. Here are some examples:

a/ The report says that the threat to the US from terrorist groups in Afghanistan is “diminished” because of the efforts of US-trained/supported forces. But it also states that the threat is still significant enough to warrant the continuation of foreign forces. Is the underlying cause of the theat fixed yet or not? And if not, why not? And will more force make any difference?

b/ It says the ANDSF is “almost entirely dependent on US funding” and that the military dependencies with the US “will endure for a long time.” So, after all this time, the country still cannot defend itself? How will more time make any difference?

c/ It mentions poverty as a driver of conflict but does not criticize the foreign powers for their lack of progress in reducing poverty — despite the funds spent.

d/ It does not critique the Doha agreement for its inbalance: holding the US to specific deliverables whilst letting the Taliban be accountable to vaguely defined commitments.

Examples of it’s partisan stance include saying that a “precipitous US withdrawal is likely to exacerbate the conflict, provoking a wider civil war.” But, the other side (Taliban) say they are fighting to remove the invaders! Might the US presence be the problem?

The report also glosses over the truth. For example, on p18 where it states, “Despite donor dependency and crippling corruption, Afghans and their international partners have built key governing institutions that could form the basis of a minimally effective state if it did not have to contend with a violent insurgency.” SIGAR would just flatly disagree with this.

It misrepresents the Doha agreement. For example on p18 of the report it says that the agreement contains a “Taliban commitment to a ceasefire.” The agreement (para 4) states, “A permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations.” That is hardly a commitment to a ceasefire.

Also, there is a strong urban bias to some of the analysis. For example, saying that civil society is strengthened — is this true for the majority of the population in rural areas? Civil society in rural areas remains unchanged: traditional leaders, the Imam and the mosque.

An independent study carried out by Brown University’s Cost of War Project argues that Congress has approved funds amounting to about one trillion dollars for Afghanistan as well as for Pakistan. Add to that the bill for other countries involved in the war and reconstruction. So, where does Afghanistan sit today?

The Taliban remain in control of large parts of the country, contest most of the rest and are nudging into government-held territory.

Poverty has risen considerably and rural people are suffering chronic drought and food insecurity with vast areas of the country predicted to be in food crisis by this year’s main harvest in September. Drinking water and sanitation in Kabul is also at crisis point.

Potential local solutions have not been sufficiently nurtured and the role of peace-makers has not been prioritised (until now). It is easy to criticize from the margins, but it seems as though two decades have passed with little to show for it. Afghanistan has arrived on the doorstep of the new century of 1400, but little appears to have changed.

So, what to do from where we are now? What has been started recently is good, but is so dreadfully late in the day that it is unlikely to succeed. The best strategy for the US and allies is to work urgently to broker sufficient peace between the parties in the country with the involvement of regional interests, and then leave as close to schedule as possible. The work of peace-making has been under-played or done badly these past two decades. As the Afghanistan Study Group’s report states, in quoting the 9/11 Commission in its 2004 report, this strategy is “as much, or more, political than military.” Even though it is late, it might work.

The US and allies should have worked harder to elevate the Taliban’s political power as a balance to its military power. Instead, foreign powers seem to have concentrated on protecting and securing the chosen leaders (Karzai and then Ghani). The Soviets made the same mistake: national reconciliation prior to their departure in 1989 was all about securing their influence by ensuring power for Mohammad Najibullah and the DRA government. And look how that ended up once Soviet aid stopped in 1992!

When the US and its NATO allies finally leave, Afghanistan will have to sort out its future in its own way just like most countries have done or continue to do. This will be done in the context of regional powers that will continue to seek their interests. Maybe an Afghan leadership will emerge that can establish peace and stability; maybe not. The country remains divided and many of the factions with their leaders from the 1990s are still active. The story so far does not bode well for that to come.